



Software Safety Tutorial Student Handout

NSWCDD-PN-14-00391

SOFTWARE CRITICALITY



Software Criticality Analysis Worksheet



STUDENT HANDOUT - POPULATE 2.a - 2.i

2.a Safety- Significant Function	2.b Safety- Significant Function (Portion)	2.c CSCI	2.d Software Function	2.e Related Hazard Number from VIPPS Worksheet	2.f Level of Mishap Severity for the Identified Hazard	2.g Software Control Category	2.h SwCl	2.i Level of Rigor Tasks Required
SSF #6: Verification of Gun	Verify Activate (Fire on fire	Gun						
deactivate, and movement Commands	cmd only if GSS ADDRESS	Controller						





Comments

NAV	AL SEA SYSTE	MS COMMA	Use for Columns 2 and 2 f						WARFARE C DAHLGE	ΈN		
Haz ID#	Phase of Operation		Hazard Description	Causal Factors	Mishap	Effects	Hazard Controls	MRI	System	Subsystem	Component(s)	(
132	Operational		detection of GSS Electronics	GCC fails to activate 120 second timer or terminate processing in response to 120	overheat,	damage	The GSS shall continuously monitor for a GSS over-temperature condition [electronics]. If a GSS over- temperature condition is detected and	3D		Gun Subsystem	Gun Control Computer	S

			halt processing after 120 seconds (if C2 does not safe/deselect)	GCC fails to activate 120 second timer or terminate processing in response to 120 second timeout	overheat, causing circuit board damage	Equipment damage	The GSS shall continuously monitor for a GSS over-temperature condition [electronics]. If a GSS over-temperature condition is detected and continues to exist 1.0 + 0.025 seconds after initial detection, the GSS shall update the status register [indicating GSS Over-temperature] for transfer to the C2 within the ID 12, and continue operation until discontinued by the C2	3D	VIPPS	Gun Subsystem	Gun Control Computer	SSF 20
188	Operational	Tactical	Upon receipt of EF23 (Safe / Deselect), the GSS fails to remove power to the gun motor causing premature motor failure	Software Failure in the Gun Control Computer	Premature motor failure	Equipment damage	None	3D	VIPPS	Gun Subsystem	Gun Control Computer	SSF 20
299	Operation	Tactical	wrong gun results in accidental firing by the (wrong) gun	The GCC software fails to validate firing commands intended for the gun, and processes commands intended for a different gun	Engage Friendly/non- hostile target	Personnel injury or death	[4.6.5.h] VIPPS [GSS] software shall prevent the lethal effector from being fired without a proper command and [C2] shall provide an alarm to the operator when an attempt is made to fire the lethal effector without a proper command. If the GSS receives an EF command with the GSS Address signal set to an illegal value, the GSS shall discard the command and transmit an Illegal Message (GSS-C2-ID04) to the C2 with the Malfunction Type signal set to 5 (Wrong GSS Address)	1D	VIPPS	Gun Subsystem	Gun Control Computer	SSF 6
310	Operation	Test		The GCC software fails to validate 'rate of gun movement'	Inadvertent physical contact of gun	Personnel injury or death	Upon receipt of gun pointing data (EF 37), the GSS shall slew the gun barrel to the pointing location (relative	1D	VIPPS	Gun Subsystem	Gun Control Computer	SSF 6
			rates when	before commanding gun tpo move at normal speed.	with personnel,		azimuth and elevation) as designated in the message. The GSS shall move the gun at normal speed (6 ms per degree) or reduced speed (60 ms per degree) as specified in the message.				VIPPS is a System us training purpo	ed for
			of gun with personnel				as opening in the message.					



VIPPS Functional Flow Diagram Use for Column 2.g



Activate

(Fire on fire cmd only if GSS ADDRESS" in fire cmd matches)

SSF-6: Verification of Gun Activation / Deactivate and Movement Commands


VALIDATE MSG FUNCTIONAL OPERATOR / C2 **DESCRIPTION** PROCESS EF ID FUNCTIONAL Oper Validate MSG function checks that each **DESCRIPTION** Оре Operat message is valid by evaluating content for Process EF ID function performs initial processing of gun command messages by assigned Gun ID, boundary conditions, and Comma message sequence based on last message verifying message transfer using a Cyclic Fire Gun Gur received. If the message is validated, the Redundancy Check (CRC) then sending the appropriate action function is called based message to the Validate Msg Function. on message content (e.g., Select Gun, Deactivate Gun, Fire Command, Master **GUN SUBSYSTE** Reset, BIT On, Activate Laser Aiming **LEVEL** Device, De-Activate Laser Aiming Device or Cmd GCU move gun to required azimuth and elevation Move Gun). **VIPPS** is a Mock System used for GCC training purposes only Periodic - convert video signal to digital and send via ID 26 **GUN SOFTWARE** Process EF ID Validate MSG **FUNCTIONAL** alidate command in sequence Receive and process EF LEVEL Intended for ADRS Glin commands



VIPPS Event Diagram



Use for Column 2.g





MIL-STD-882E Software Control Categories NAL



Use for Column 2.g

Level	Name	Description
1	Autonomous (AT)	Software functionality that exercises autonomous control authority over potentially safety-significant hardware systems, subsystems, or components without the possibility of predetermined safe detection and intervention by a control entity to preclude the occurrence of a mishap or hazard. (This definition includes complex system/software functionality with multiple subsystems, interacting parallel processors, multiple interfaces, and safety-critical functions that are time critical.)
2	Semi- Autonomous (SAT)	Software functionality that exercises control authority over potentially safety-significant hardware systems, subsystems, or components, allowing time for predetermined safe detection and intervention by independent safety mechanisms to mitigate or control the mishap or hazard. (This definition includes the control of moderately complex system/software functionality, no parallel processing, or few interfaces, but other safety systems/mechanisms can partially mitigate. System and software fault detection and annunciation notifies the control entity of the need for required safety actions.) Software item that displays safety-significant information requiring immediate operator entity to execute a predetermined action for mitigation or control over a mishap or hazard. Software exception, failure, fault, or delay will allow, or fail to prevent, mishap occurrence. (This definition assumes that the safety-critical display information may be time critical, but the time available does not exceed the time required for adequate control entity response and hazard control.)
3	Redundant Fault Tolerant (RFT)	Software functionality that issues commands over safety significant hardware systems, subsystems, or components requiring a control entity to complete the command function. The system detection and functional reaction includes redundant, independent fault tolerant mechanisms for each defined hazardous condition. (This definition assumes that there is adequate fault detection, annunciation,, and system recovery to prevent the hazard occurrence if software fails, malfunctions, or degrades. There are redutolerancendant sources of safety-significant information, and mitigating functionality can respond within any time-critical period.) Software that generates information of a safety-critical nature used to make critical decisions. The system includes several redundant, independent fault tolerant mechanisms for each hazardous condition, detection, and display.
4	Influential	Software generates information of a safety-related nature used to make decisions by the operator, but does not require operator action to avoid a mishap.
5	No Safety Impact (NSI)	Software functionality that does not possess command or control authority over safety-significant hardware systems, subsystems, or components and does not provide safety-significant information. Software does not provide safety-significant or time sensitive data or information that requires control entity interaction. Software does not transport or resolve communication of safety-significant or time sensitive data.



MIL-STD-882E Software Control Categories NAL



Use for Column 2.g

Level	Name	Description
1	Autonomous (AT)	 Autonomous CONTROL over safety hardware systems, and No possibility of detection and intervention by control entity
2	Semi- Autonomous (SAT)	 CONTROL over safety hardware systems, and Time for detection and intervention by INDEPENDENT safety mechanism SW that displays safety-significant data for immediate predetermined operator action to prevent mishap, or The SW fault or delay will allow, or fail to prevent, the mishap
3	Redundant Fault Tolerant (RFT)	 Issues commands over safety hardware system, and Requires control entity to complete command function, and Includes REDUNDANT, INDEPENDENT fault tolerant mechanisms Generates information of safety-critical nature to make decisions, and System includes SEVERAL REDUNDANT, INDEPENDENT fault tolerant mechanisms
4	Influential	• Generates information of safety-related nature to make decisions by the operator, and
5	No Safety Impact (NSI)	Software f subsystem • Does not require operator action to avoid mishap time sensitive data or information that requires control entity interaction. Software does not transport or resolve communication of safety-significant or time sensitive data.



MIL-STD-882E Software Criticality Index



Use for Column 2.h and 2.i

For Gun Software Function : Validate_MSG

Software Safety Criticality Matrix							
		Seve	rity Category				
Software Control Category	Catastrophic (1)	Critical (2)	Marginal (3)	Negligible (4)			
1	SwCl 1	SwCl 1	SwCl 3	SwCl 4			
2	SwCl 1	SwCl 2	SwCl 3	SwCl 4			
3	SwCl 2	SwCl 3	SwCI 4	SwCl 4			
4	SwCl 3	SwCl 4	SwCl 4	SwCl 4			
5	SwCl 5	SwCl 5	SwCl 5	SwCl 5			

VIPPS is a Mock System used for training purposes only

SwCI	Level of Rigor
SwCl 1	Program shall perform analysis of requirements, architecture, design, and code; and conduct in-depth safety-specific testing.
SwCl 2	Program shall perform analysis of requirements, architecture, and design; and conduct indepth safety-specific testing.
SwCl 3	Program shall perform analysis of requirements and architecture, and conduct in-depth safety-specific testing.
SwCl 4	Program shall conduct safety-specific testing.
SwCl 5	Once assessed by safety engineering as Not Safety, then no safety specific analysis or verification is required.





SOFTWARE SAFETY TUTORIAL STUDENT HANDOUT

ARCHITECTURAL AND DESIGN ANALYSIS



Architecture and Design Analysis



- Task 1: Identify causal factors using SW generic requirements at the architecture level
 - Review AOP-52 definitions and JSSSEH Generic Requirements (*E.8.5*, *E.3.13*)
 - > Review architectural data against current hazards and functional hazard analysis
 - Use the SSF-6 Interface and Function Architecture Diagram to identify and record causal factors
- Task 2: Identify causal factors using previous architecture hazard analysis at the design level
 - Compare SSF-6 Control Flow Analysis of Interrupt Design and PFS approved Control Flow Analysis of Interrupt (Concept of Execution) Architecture Diagram
 - Review design data against current hazards and previous architectural analysis and determine if additional risk is created and record causal factors identified



Task 1: JSSSEH Generic Requirements



STUDENT REFERENCE

Analyze architecture to ensure it supports verification of safety data

Analyze architecture then design to ensure they support positive feedback for safety **functions**

E.8.5 Data Transfer Messages

Data transfer messages shall be of a predetermined format and content. Each transfer shall contain a word or character string indicating the message length (if variable), the type of data, and the content of the message. At a minimum, parity checks and checksums shall be used for verification of correct data transfer. CRCs shall be used where practical. *No information from data* transfer messages shall be used prior to verification of correct

data transfer.

F.3.13 Positive Feedback Mechanisms

Software control of critical functions shall have feedback

<u>mechanisms</u> that give positive indications of the function's

Architecture Diagram


occurrence.

Exercise #1



Task 1: SW Causal Factors Identified by Architectural Analysis







Task 1: SW Causal Factors Identified by Architectural Analysis




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Mishap	Hazard	Causal Factor Description Based on JSSSEH Violations	Analysis Source
Engage Friendly / non-hostile target	Fire command processed by the wrong gun results in accidental firing by the (wrong) gun		SSF-6 Interface and Function Architecture Diagram SSF-6 Interface and Function Architecture Diagram



Task 2: VIPPS PFS Approved Control Flow Analysis of Interrupt Architecture








Task 2: SSF-6 Control Flow Analysis of Interrupt Design







Task 2: SW Causal Factors Identified by Design Analysis



Hazard	Causal Factor Description Based on Design Evaluation	Analysis Source
Fire command processed by the wrong gun results in accidental firing by the (wrong) gun		Comparison of SSF- 6 Control Flow Analysis of Interrupt Design and SSF-6 Control Flow Analysis of Interrupt Architecture
		Comparison of SSF- 6 Control Flow Analysis of Interrupt Design and SSF-6 Control Flow Analysis of Interrupt Architecture
	Fire command processed by the wrong gun results in accidental firing by the (wrong)	Fire command processed by the wrong gun results in accidental firing by the (wrong)

System used for training purposes only





SOFTWARE SAFETY TUTORIAL STUDENT HANDOUT

CODE ANALYSIS



Code Analysis



- Task 1: Data Structure Analysis For the given safety significant data items define the data types and usages using highlighted yellow code.
 Define any identified issues.
- Task 2: Data Flow Analysis Conduct data flow analysis to identify errors in the use of data that is accessed by multiple routines:
 - > Find "GunID" in each of the functions listed
 - Document the value of the data item from each function
 - After all values captured, determine if a safety concern exists and document rationale
- Task 3: Use AOP-52 requirement, compliance assessment, and function to define compliance rationale. Define any safety issues.



Common Data Types



- Character (char):
 - This is a single character, like X, £, 4, or *
- String:
 - This is a "string" of characters of any length
- Integer (int):
 - A whole number whole meaning there are no digits after a decimal point. So 65 would be a valid integer; 65.78 would not.
- Floating-point number (float):
 - A number that may have digits after the decimal place. 65.00 is technically a floating point number, even though it could be represented just as easily as an integer as 65. It takes more memory to store a float, which is why there is a distinction instead of just creating a "number" datatype.
- Boolean (bool):
 - > A variable to represent true or false (or it could also mean 0 or 1)



processEF_ID Function





VIPPS is a Mock System used for training purposes only

//processEF_ID Function – is called by mainGun Function to initiate a CRC check and EF message verification after an EF command is received from C2

//declare Local variables Boolean CRC pass,

//A local variable is one declared within the body of a function. //This is a Boolean type variable; used to indicate the result of the CRC check. If the check is 'pass', the //variable will be set to True (1). Otherwise the variable will be set to False (0).

Call CRC Function and store the return value in CRC pass;

If CRC pass is equal to true,

then

Send an ID02 back to C2, Call validateMsgFunction,

Else

Send an ID04 back to C2;

//EndIf

//End of processEF ID Function

//CRC function is called to ensure the integrity of the message bits in the received EF command.

//CRC pass='true' means the bits in the received EF command have not been corrupted.

//Send an Acknowledge (ID02) to C2

//Call validate message function to validate command is in sequence and sent to the intended gun address

//CRC pass='false' means the bits in the received EF command have been corrupted.

//GCC then transmits an Illegal Message (ID04) to the C2



CRC_Function





//End of CRC Function

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*************************	****************
// <u>CRC Function</u> – is called by processEF_ID Function to check the receiv	ved EF command is a valid EF message or not.
//declare Local variables	
Boolean CRC_pass,	//Boolean type variable: 1(True) or 0(False) value
Integer calculated_CRC, saved_CRC,	
Get the values from the fields in the EFmessage to perform CRC calculation;	//Values used to perform the CRC calculation are stored in //word 0 (bit 31-0) and half of word 1 (bit 31-16).
Calculate the CRC based on those values and store the result in calculate_CRC;	
Get the pre-calculated CRC value from EFmessage and store it in the saved_CRC variable	e; //The pre-calculated CRC value is stored in word 1 (bit15-0) //of each EF message.
If calculate_CRC is equal to saved_CRC, then	
Call verifyGunIDFunction and store the return value in verifyGunID;	//Call the verifyGunID Function to compare the gun IDs //between the config file and the received EF
If verifyGunID is equal to true,	3
then	
Set CRC_pass to true;	//Set the CRC check to be true if and only if the CRC values
//EndIf	//are same and the gun IDs are the same.
Else	
Set CRC_pass to false;	
//EndIf	
return the CRC_pass value to the called function;	//Return either a 1 or 0 value to the processEF_ID function.



mainGun Function



STUDENT REFERENCE

VIPPS is a Mock System used for training purposes only

//declare Global Variables - a global variable is a variable declared outside all functions.

Long EFmessage, Integer GunID, Float defaultAZ, Integer currentAZ, Integer defaultEL, currentEL, Integer defaultGunSpeed, currentGunSpeed, Boolean de_activate CMD flag.

Boolean verifyGunID,

//This is a 64-bit variable; used to store two 32-bit word EF data. //This is an integer type variable; used to store the value of Gun ID //This is a float type variable; used to store the default azimuth position. //This is an integer type variable used to store the current azimuth position //Both are integer type variables; used to store the elevation position //Both are integer type variables; used to store the gun speed //This is a Boolean type variable which has a either True (1) or False (0) value; used to indicate whether or //not the deactivate command has been received

//mainGun Function – where GCC program starts execution.

//Start the mainGun Function

Get the value of the gun address from Config File and store it in the GunID variable;

Get the value of the AZ position from Config File and store it in the defaultAZ variable;

Set the value of the currentAZ variable equal to the value of the defaultAZ variable;

Call processEF IDFunction;

//End of mainGun Function

//Gun address is equal to 2 in the Configuration File

//The value after decimal point will be truncated if a float //number is going to be saved in an integer type variable.



Task 1: Data Structure Analysis Exercise



STUDENT HANDOUT - Populate Table for the given safety significant data items using highlighted yellow code

Variable Name	Data Type	Global/ Local	Where is Variable used/referenced	Variable used/referenced consistently? If not, explain and provide any safety implications
CRC_pass			processEF_ID Function CRC_Function	
1. currentAZ	1.	1.	1. mainGun Function	
2. defaultAZ	2.	2.		

VIPPS is a Mock System used for training purposes only



verifyGunID Function





VIPPS is a Mock System used for training purposes only

//verifyGunID Function – is called to check the value of Gun ID specified in the received EF match with the value of Gun ID specified in the config file. //Start verifyGunID Function //declare Local variable //A local variable is one declared within the body of a //function. //An integer type variable used to store the value of gun Integer gunIDfrmMsg, //address from the received EF //A Boolean type variable used to indicate the pass or fail Boolean verifyGunID flag, //condition of checking the values of gun addresses between //the received EF and the config file. Set GunID equal to 0; //Reset the value of GunID to 0 (zero). Recall that a GunID of //0 is valid and represents Gun 1. Call Call getGunIDfrmMsgFunction and store the return value into gunIDfrmMsg variable; If gunIDfrmMsg is equal to GunID, then Set verifyGunID flag to True, Call FireGunFunction, //Call the FireGunFunction to initiate sending an EF39 (Fire //Command) Call validateMsgFunction; //Call the ValidateMsgFunction to validate content of the //current EF received from C2 Else Set verifyGunID flag to False; //EndIf return the verifyGunID flag value to the called function; //Return either 1 or 0 value of verifyGunID flag to the //validateMsg Function. //End of verifyGunID Function



Task 2: Data Flow Analysis Exercise



STUDENT HANDOUT - Populate Table for GunID using highlighted yellow code

VIPPS is a Mock System used for training purposes only

Data Item	Data type	Global/ Local	Where is Variable used/referenced	Value stored in Variable	Any safety concerns? [If yes, explain]
GunID	Integer	Global	declare Global variable		
			2. mainGun Function		
			3. verifyGunID Function		



AOP-52 Compliance Assessment Definition of Terms



Term	Definition	
Flags and Variables	Flags and variable names shall be unique. Flags and variables shall have a single purpose and shall be defined and initialized prior to use.	
Execution Path	Safety Critical Computing System Functions (SCCSFs) shall have one and only one possible path leading to their execution.	
Conditional Statements	Conditional statements shall have all possible conditions satisfied and be under full software control (i.e., there shall be no potential unresolved input to the conditional statement). Conditional statements shall be analyzed to ensure that the conditions are reasonable for the task and that all potential conditions are satisfied and not left to a default condition. All condition statements shall be annotated with their purpose and expected outcome for given conditions.	



moveGun Function





VIPPS is a Mock System used for training purposes only

//moveGun Function – which is called by validateMsg Function to command the gun motor to move gun to the specified AZ and EL positions with specified speed. //Start moveGun Function which is passing three parameter variables i.e. AZ, EL, and gun speed //declare Local variables //A local variable is one declared within the body of a function. Integer commandedAZ, Integer commandedEL, Integer commandedGunSpeed, Boolean moveGunStatus flag = False, //A Boolean value ('True' or 'False') used to reflect if the gun is //now pointing in the direction specified in the message; it is //initialized at not pointing to the specified direction //Set the commandedAZ value Get the value of AZ position from the parameter (defaultAZ) and store it in the commandedAZ variable; Get the value of EL position from the parameter (defaultEL) and store it in the commandedEL variable; //Set the commandedEL value //Set the commandedGunSpeed value If the value of the commanded AZ variable is "not" equal to the value of the current AZ variable, then Call moveAZ_MotorFunction (commandedAZ, commandedGunSpeed); // This function commands the gun azimuth movement //EndIf //End of moveGun Function



verifyGunID Function





VIPPS is a Mock System used for training purposes only

//verifyGunID Function – is called to check the value of Gun ID specified in the received EF match with the value of Gun ID specified in the config file.

//Start verifyGunID Function

//declare Local variable

Integer gunIDfrmMsg,

Boolean verifyGunID_flag,

Call Call getGunIDfrmMsgFunction and store the return value into gunIDfrmMsg variable;

If gunIDfrmMsg is equal to GunID, then

Set verifyGunID_flag to True,

Call FireGunFunction,

Call validateMsgFunction;

Else

Set verifyGunID flag to False;

//EndIf

return the verifyGunID_flag value to the called function;

//End of verifyGunID Function

//Call the FireGunFunction to initiate sending an EF39 (Fire //Command)

//Call the ValidateMsgFunction to validate content of the //current EF received from C2

//A local variable is one declared within the body of a

//An integer type variable used to store the value of gun

//A Boolean type variable used to indicate the pass or fail //condition of checking the values of gun addresses between

//function.

//address from the received EF

//the received EF and the config file.

//Return either 1 or 0 value of verifyGunID_flag to the //validateMsg Function.



Task 3: AOP-52 Code Compliance Exercise



STUDENT HANDOUT

VIPPS is a Mock System used for training purposes only

AOP-52 Requirement	Compliant	Function where code error is located	Rationale for non- compliance	Potential Safety Impact(s)
Conditional Statements	No	validateMsgFunction	Select and power on the gun for ANY EF except for EF 21 - GSS Select	Will result in the Gun remaining active (selected and powered on) no matter what EF is received from C2, including an EF 23 - Safe Deselect (Power Off)
Flags and Variables	No	moveGunFunction		
Execution Path	No	verifyGunIDFunction		





SOFTWARE SAFETY TUTORIAL STUDENT HANDOUT

TECHNOLOGY INSERTION



Task 1: Technology Insertion of Ethernet Protocol



- Task 1: Review reference material on Ethernet Protocol.
 Based on your review of the technology, define:
 - Any concerns about using the technology
 - Any recommendations concerning design selections or mitigations

Technology of Concern	Concerns(s)	Recommendation(s)
Ethernet Protocol		



Task 2: Technology Insertion of TCP Protocol



- Task 2: Review reference material on TCP Protocol.
 Based on your review of the technology, define:
 - Any concerns about using the technology
 - Any recommendations concerning design selections or mitigations

Technology of Concern	Concerns(s)	Recommendation(s)
TCP Protocol		